‘I am watching you’: COVID-19, economic crisis, and panopticon of the digital virus in Cambodia

Sokphea Young

sophiabelieve@gmail.com

Honorary Research Fellow, University College London, UK

Introduction

In Southeast Asia, Cambodia is the most impoverished nation whose economy relies on garment and manufacturing industries, apart from tourism and agriculture. The country’s garment and manufacturing sector, especially the garment and footwear industry, emerged in the early 1990s after the first general elections organised by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The United States and the European Union (EU) have supported Cambodia’s export-driven economy through their Generalised Systems of Preferences (GSP) and other trade schemes. The EU, for example, has allowed Cambodia to export duty-free and quota-free to its market since 2001 under the Everything but armed (EBA) scheme. These have boosted Cambodia’s garment sector that now employs about 600,000 Cambodians, most of whom are women from rural areas. With the support of the garment and other industries, Cambodia has managed to significantly reduce poverty and transformed its economy to become a lower-middle-income country in 2016. Annually, Cambodia exported about EUR4 billion (2017-2019) (European Commission 2020) and USD 4 billion (2017-2019) (United States Census Bureau, 2021) of apparel products and goods to the EU and the US markets, respectively. As such, the manufacturing industry contributes about 10 per cent (2017-2019) to the Cambodian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank, 2020).

While these supports are significant to the country and her people, the Royal Government of Cambodia’s human rights, and freedom of association and speech, and democracy in general, have been sabotaged as the country has leaned towards authoritarianism, including the dissolution of the prominent opposition party, Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017, and the on-going intimidation and spurious arrests of human rights and environmental defenders, restricting space of civil society organisations. These restrictions have provoked the EU to withdraw its EBA scheme to Cambodia, harming workers and its related sector. Many factories were forced to shut down without proper indemnities for the employees.

Coincided with the imposing tariff by the EU, Cambodia’s economy, especially its garment and manufacturing, are doubly punished by the emergence of coronavirus (COVID-19), which spread across the world. Not only have pandemic severely disrupted the global supply chain and markets of garment and manufacturing industries, leaving many jobless, but it has also affected the entire country’s socio-economics. The lack of proper remedial measures to the impacts by the government has sparked dissatisfaction, provoking activism. Amid the country’s leaning toward authoritarianism as manifested by the 2018 election, and the restriction imposed by the government to contain the virus, many were forced to stay at home, compelled to subscribe to digital platforms for study, works, communication, and activism. This has reframed those who have been affected by the EU’s sanction and pandemic not to stage offline (on-street) but online activities to advocate for better solutions. 

In this blog, I seek to understand online activities and activism during the pandemic and examine the adverse consequences of offline avoidance in the time of the pandemic. This blog argues that the endeavour, either by the state or individuals, to avoid offline activities to contain the virus, has adversely induced a new form of virus, that is digital surveillance, that has infiltrated everyone’s digital devices. More than the panopticon of the virus, which may be observed as symptoms showed, the new form of digital virus embodies and incubates in every device, smartphone, without showing a symptom like COVID-19. While social media is a COVID-19 free platform for ordinary citizens and activists to connect and express their concerns during the pandemic, this platform is an invisible hand of surveillance of the governed body.

This blog is written based on my on-going observation of Cambodia’s socio-political and technological development, employing digital ethnography to collect data from digital sources and from observing relevant social media pages and profiles. Quantitative data presented in this blog is acquired from using Google Search, focusing on “news” media outlets captured by Google search engine.  

The remainder of this blog begins with a discussion about conceptualising how digital media become a new form of digital virus, a form of the pandemic that is neither known to us, in the context of surveillance. It then illustrates how COVID-19 induces Cambodians to subscribe to social media and digital devices before providing evidence on how the latter would strengthen an authoritarian surveillance system.

Panopticon of virus and digital technologies

The digital community has been recognised as a modern tool of human development and evolution. Many have been impressed by this evolution as digital machines and devices can process data and circulate images and voices from a community to another. Kittler (2010, p.11) argues that “machines take tasks – drawing, writing, seeing, hearing, word-processing, memory and even knowing – that once were thought unique to humans and often perform them better”. Given this capability, digital devices and machines like smartphones and cloud devices, become a modern type of panoptic tools incubated in our everyday lifestyle. The devices and the internet are now replacing our basic needs. Drawing on Foucault’s (2012) conception of the panoptic prison cell, these devices gradually observe and incubate in our body and mind without warning us; health applications are exemplars in this context. It is like a virus that has affected us by having not given us a symptom of it.  As we unintendedly concede or consent to do so, this new type of digital virus has extracted our personal and privacy data for buyers’ commercial and political purposes. Zuboff (2019) rightly illustrates that access to the digital community exposes oneself to a significant risk. It is a risk of losing or co-opting their privacy rights, rendering privacy data (our private space in essence) to the corporate giants. Having submitted to the machine learning system, holding the state and politicians accountable to citizens, primarily through activism, is facing difficulties. More often than not, for profit-making purposes, the media corporate capitalists tend to co-opt with the surveillance and authoritarian states to gain legitimate power as in the US presidential and UK parliamentary elections.

Drawing on how activists and state interact in China, MacKinnon (2010) introduces a concept of “networked authoritarianism”, which is a political tactic that creates selective social openings for transparency but, in fact, monitors and stifles dissents (He & Warren 2011). This networked authoritarianism in the digital era is framed based on the notion of a networked society whose key social structures and activities are organised and linked electronically (Castells 2010). The networked authoritarian Chinese government, for instance, allows people to use the internet to submit grievances or unjust activities, but the government also monitors who reports or submits the grievances. In China, only specific applications or types of social media platform are allowed to use, and this eases the ruling regime to scrutinise and surveil the users to curb outrageous dissents. The use of these digital communication technologies also induces side effects, one of which is the exposure to the surveillance system (Howard & Hussain 2013), a critical concern for digital activism in the non-democracy ruling systems that appear to have adopted the Chinese authoritarian style of panoptic surveillance.

Cambodia’s online community and activism amid the pandemic

The foregoing theorisation of how digital communication and technologies render risks reverberates Cambodia’s and other countries’ situation during the pandemic. Following the instruction of the government not to mobilise or conduct physical contacts, especially in education and office works, the pandemic has forced millions of Cambodians to subscribe to digital devices and communication platforms. By September 2020, about 67% (11.28 million of about 16 million) of Cambodians have subscribed to Facebook (NapoleonCat, 2020), making this social media site a popular means of communication among Cambodian people, particularly youth. This figure climbed from about 9.73 million subscribers in December 2019, before the pandemic, and it gradually increased to 9.78 million users in January 2020 when the pandemic was not widely spread into the country. As the COVID-19 began to import to the country in early February 2020, the number of subscribers surged rapidly to 10.52 million in March and 10.95 million in May the same year (see Figure 1). Young adults and children are among the new subscribers with the age range between 13-17 (7.8%), 18-24 (31.4%) and 25-34 (47.5%) as of March 2020 (NapoleonCat, 2021). Likewise, the number of cellular smartphone subscribers also increased as these devices are required to access social media: Facebook, Telegram and YouTube. International Telecommunication Union (2020) reports that the number of mobile cellular phone subscribers in Cambodia increased from 19.42 million in 2018 to at least 21.42 million in 2019. Compared to the total population of 16 million, 2019 data suggests that a Cambodian could afford at least two phones (Young 2021a). Given the low quality of education, the higher percentage of young subscribers causes critical concern on data and privacy issue, and the users’ rights. These young adults and children subscribe to the internet and social media for online education, watching Livestream lectures or pre-recorded video teaching. Albeit the supervision of their parents or guardian, we have seen many of these users are addicted to online movies on YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok, online game, and exposed to inappropriate contents, instead of access to teaching materials.

Figure 1: Number of Facebook subscribers during the COVID-19 pandemic

Source: Author’s compilation from NapoleonCat, 2020

Not only did the pandemic compel ordinary Cambodians to go online, but it also affected Cambodia economy (coincided with the partial withdrawal of the EBA programme). Coupled with the decline of the purchase order in the apparel and footwear industries, Cambodia’s GDP growth in 2020 was predicted to be between -1 to -2.9 per cent, and that about 1.76 million jobs were also at risk (World Bank, 2020). The World Bank emphasised that the poverty rate in the country is to increase by 20 per cent. Some factories closed down as they were either affected by the impact of COVID-19 on the global supply chain or by the withdrawal of the EU’s EBA scheme. This raised the affected population’s concerns, especially garment and manufacturing workers, to seek the government’s intervention and remedies. Given the government’s restrictions on physical movement, the ability to lobby the government and concerned stakeholders were limited to online activities. They began to use social media platforms such as Facebook to express the grievances such as indemnities (as the factories were shut-down) and dissatisfaction with the government’s intervention in remedying job loss and cut due to COVID-19.  Either made by individuals or media outlets, news on job losses and cuts, people’s dissatisfaction with the government measures was widely observed.

Figure 2: Women rights and arrests report on digital media and news[1]

Source: Author, 2021

As I traced the development of news on women workers on Google Search (see Figure 2), we found that “women rights Cambodia” are often reported by local and international media outlets: the number of its citations has increased from 47,000 times in 2019 to 66,100 time in 2020 (September). While digital and social media become platforms for disgruntled women to frame and amplify their concerns to the public, the endeavour has not been the ideal solution. By querying the term “women workers arrest” in Cambodia, I found that the frequency of the term mentioned in digital media exploded from 7,170 times in 2019 to 43,800 times in 2020 (September). This signified that many women workers or activists were arrested, detained or harassed by the authority. For instance, a women worker, who was a member of a union, was arrested because her post on Facebook criticised her employer, who dismissed 88 workers without following the government of Cambodia’s guidelines and instructions not to cut jobs but reduce workers’ wage government instruction (Kelly & Grant 2020). Following her post, the employer decided to re-employ the workers, and she immediately deleted her post from Facebook, but, still, the employer filed a complaint against her accusing that she created fake news to defame the company and the buyers. The ability to notice who is posting thing or creating news from their smartphone onto Facebook has indicated how effective the government’s surveillance system is. In one instance, the prime minister of Cambodia who has been in power for more than three decades claimed that smartphone allows the government to track and trace anyone effectively (Young 2021b; Young 2021c). He claimed that “If I want to take action against you, we will get [you] within seven hours at the most” (Doyle 2016). Anyone dares to speak against the supreme leaders and or the governance system; the consequence thereof is predictable based on the statement.

Figure 3. Number of people arrested between 2010 and 2020

Source: modified from Young & Heng, 2021

While many Cambodians resorted to online to contain and prevent the spread of the virus, human rights, political activists, environmental and human right defenders, workers and protesters also resort to online activities. As they go online, they submit to a new form of authorities or what I call a “surveillance virus”, which surrounds the users every time. As in Figure 3 above, it appears that the pandemic causes a surge of spurious arrests of political activists, environmental and human rights defenders, workers, and protesters. The increase in the arrest in 2019 was induced by two important reasons. First, authorities arrested those activists who were disgruntled with the dissolution of the opposition party (CNRP) in 2017 prior to the 2018 election. The election allowed the ruling party to take control of all national assembly seats and Hun Sen to remain in power for more than three decades (Young 2021c). Secondly, the arrests were made in response to those who supported the attempt of CNRP leader, Sam Rainsy (who has lived in exile abroad since 2016), to return to Cambodia in 2019. As of September 2020, the number of people arrested by authorities increased to 55, alarming the international communities’ concerns over the country’s tendency to practice authoritarianism amid the pandemic. The arrest is enabled by a form of “networked authoritarianism” as put forward by MacKinnon (2010) in China, where the governed body allowed online grievance submissions, but tackling those critical ones as their comments or grievances undermine the ruling regime’s authority and legitimacy. Cambodian activists’ critiques of how the ruling government handled the pandemic and socio-economic issues, and also other social issues during the crisis have been subject to scrutiny and surveillance, of which social media-mediated-devices are invisible tools of the ruling system.

Conclusion

In this blog, I have demonstrated how COVID-19 has affected not only Cambodia’s economy, but also pushed many Cambodians to go online, subscribing to digital platforms. Digital media platforms are believed to help contain the spread of COVID-19, but such endeavour has apparently compelled the users to be infected by a new form of virus, digital surveillance whose symptom may not be diagnosed or known to the users but the governed body. This form of the digital virus has surrounded users, placing the users in a panoptic prison cell of the surveillance system. The users only realise that they are in the cell when the observers/guards (the government in this instance) take actions against them, as illustrated by women workers and activists in the present study and beyond. This new type of virus has tightened the authoritarian surveillance system to effectively monitor the subject’s antagonistic behaviour, citizens and activists, which may undermine the ruling system’s legitimacy.    

---

[1] I used key terms to search on Google, and classified the results of the search by year. To ensure that all search results are about Cambodia, “Cambodia” are always added to individual terms when searched on Google, “Women workers arrest Cambodia” for example. These search results are limited to “news” rather than “all” results in the Google search engine.

References

Castells, M 2010 The rise of the network society: Information age: Economy, society, and culture. West Sussex: Willey-Blackwell.

Doyle, K 2016 Cambodian leaders’ love-hate relationship with Facebook, 7 January 2016. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35250161 (Last accessed on 20 January 2021).

European Commission 2020 Countries and regions, 18 June 2020. Available at www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/cambodia/index_en.htm (Last accessed on 26 July 2020).

He, B and Warren, M E 2011 Authoritarian deliberation: The deliberative turn in Chinese political development.  Perspectives on Politics 9 (2): 269-289.

Howard P N & Hussain M M 2013 Democracy’s fourth wave? Digital media and the Arab Spring. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

International Telecommunication Union 2020 Mobile-cellular subscription 2020, 18 January 2021. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx (Last accessed on 25 February 2021).

Kelly, A and Grant H 2020 Jailed for a Facebook post: garment workers’ rights at risk during Covid-19, 16 June 2020. Available at  https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/16/jailed-for-a-facebook-post-garment-workers-rights-at-risk-during-covid-19 (Last accessed on 20 January 2021).

Kittler, F 2010 Optical media. Cambridge: Polity

MacKinnon, R 2010 Networked authoritarianism in China and beyond: Implications for global internet freedom. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.

NapoleonCat 2020 Facebook users in Cambodia: September 2020. Available at www.napoleoncat.com/stats/facebook-users-in-cambodia/2020/09 (Last accessed on 26 July 2020).

NapoleonCat 2021. Facebook users in Cambodia: March 2020. Available at https://napoleoncat.com/stats/facebook-users-in-cambodia/2020/03 (Last accessed on 1 February 2021)

United States Census Bureau 2021 Trade in goods with Cambodia. Available at  www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5550.html (Last accessed on 15 January 2021).

World Bank 2020 Cambodia economic update: Cambodia in the time of COVID-19. Washington DC: World Bank.

Young, S & Heng, K 2021 Digital and social media: How Cambodian women’s rights workers cope with the adverse political and economic environment amid COVID-19. Lund: Raoul Wallenberg Institute.

Young, S 2021a Citizens of photography: visual activism, social media and rhetoric of collective action in Cambodia. South East Asia Research. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/0967828X.2021.1885305

Young, S 2021b Internet, Facebook, competing political narratives, and political control in Cambodia. Media Asia. DOI: http://dx.doi.orgdoi.org/10.1080/01296612.2021.1881285

Young, S 2021c Strategies of authoritarian survival and dissensus in Southeast Asia: Weak Men versus Strongmen. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zuboff, S 2019 The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for the future at the new frontier of power. New York: Profile Books.

Author information

Sokphea Young obtained his PhD from the University of Melbourne, Australia, and is currently an Honorary Research Fellow at the University College London (UK). His research interests are in the areas of civil society, social media, citizenship, Chinese globalism, and political development in Southeast Asia. His research published in Journal of International Relations and Development, the Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, Journal of Civil Society, Asian Politics & Policies, Asian Journal of Social Science, South East Asia Research, Media Asia, and Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. He is the author of the forthcoming book entitled “Strategies of authoritarian survival and dissensus in Southeast Asia: Weak Men versus Strongmen” with Palgrave Macmillan (June 2021).

Acknowledgements

The author received financial support for this article’s research from the European Research Council-funded project entitled PHOTODEMOS (Citizens of photography: The camera and the political Imagination), grant number 695283, at the University College London.

This blog was previously published by SLE Southeast Asia Blog

‘I am watching you’: COVID-19, economic crisis, and panopticon of the digital virus in Cambodia

A long-haul fight during COVID-19: A risky journey from the UK to Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Singapore)

Dear Insights on Southeast Asia

I have enjoyed reading this new blog for a while. As a contribution to the blog, I am writing to share my flight experience from the UK (London) to Southeast Asia (Cambodia) via Singapore. I hope this experience is worth sharing to readers who wish to fly from the UK or Europe Cambodia. In this journey, I will also compare how the UK or probably even the whole EU, handle travellers to contain COVID-19 at London Heathrow Airport with Southeast Asian nations (Singapore, Cambodia). After experiencing about nine months lockdown and living in a square room and coping with stress, last month, I decided to travel to Cambodia, my home country, as I see COVID-19 in the country was not much worse compared to the UK, between 16,000-19,000 cases per day. However, the recent outbreak in Cambodia has disappointed my plan, but I have to fly because I already paid for the airfare.

Almost two months ago, before flying or choosing airlines, I did some researches and asked friends who had experience of a long-haul flight (up to 15 hours in total to exclude layover). I chose Singapore Airline. There are flights via South Korea, Thailand, and Japan, but I chose Singapore Air in term of airfare, service and safety measures.

A month before my departure, I prepared 4 3M/N95 masks (1: for inflight, 1: transit, 1: another flight, and 1 when you landed in Cambodia), a transparent face shield, hand sanitiser jells, cough sweets, and diarrhoea and flu tablets. I like cough sweet the most, even I am healthy, but it is very dehydrated on 13 hours flight from London to Singapore. I took immune pills two weeks before the flight to boost my immune system. I BELIEVE THIS IS ESSENTIAL EVEN YOU DO NOT TRAVEL BY AIRE. I STRONGLY RECOMMENDED N95 Mask as in the photo. Unlike other masks, this one is much convenient because when you speak your lips will not touch the mask layers. Imagine 13 hours flight, you will smell YOUR OWN MOUTH and get sick by that.

• 

• 

• 

• 

  Immune tablets that I took

To the Airport. Compared to public transportation: buses and underground trains, I would spend some money on a private taxi, or Uber to be safe. Travel alone is better than with unknown herds using public transpiration services. You may know that the spike of COVID cases in the UK is linked to public transportations. London underground is a crowded since they do not have proper seat arrangement, social distancing and space between travellers to avoid close contact.

Advertisements

At London Heathrow. I arrived at the airport about 2.5 hours before the flight. At Terminal 2, there was no standard social distancing arrangement besides queueing from the passenger drop off section to the check-in counters.  Not many cared about social distancing, 2 or 1.5 meters apart from each other, even FACE COVER (they called it that, not a mask; I FOUND FACE COVER unhelpful) is compulsory inside the terminal. At the check-in counter, I was asked to present a health certificate: COVID-19-free. I was exempted since I was travelling to my home country (I will explain that it is not helpful at all). After checking in, I went through a security check, and again there was no proper arrangement beside lining, not even 1.5 meters apart. THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE WHY THE TRANSMISSION RATE IN THE UK or EU increased sharply after first or second waves or lockdown.

Inside Heathrow’s departure terminal: Shops are opening, and as you know, BLACK FRIDAY remains, and you can still enjoy duty-free shopping. Discount everywhere. You can kill time and wander around shopping, and some of them do not respect social distancing.

Before boarding: I had temperature checked by Singapore Airline staff and was called by our row and seat number to board the flight, to avoid the crowd. Before entering the plane, each of us gets a health kit bag containing a hand sanitiser, a mask, a wipe, and a bottle of water.

• 

  A page of health and safety kit

• 

  Health and safety kit: hand sanitiser

• 

  Health and safety kit: a disinfection wipe

• 

  My personal medicine kit

• 

• 

  Flight attendance

In the plane: we were arranged to sit with empty seat/ space in between seats we were assign (unless you know each other you can chose to seat together). IT IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA, and I FELT SAFE instead of sitting next to an unknown person (I MET a CAMBODIAN STUDENT FROM AUSTRALIA said her flight from Brisbane to Singapore arranged seat the same mine). ONE IMPORTANT NOTE is that if you could check online and select your preferred seats would be great. I DID SELECT SEAT in advance. I would recommend those at the EXIT AREA, LAST ROW, and ROW against the laboratory seats to avoid being SURROUNDED. If you cannot do that, you might be lucky to sit next to those EU/UK citizens who have COVID-19-free certificate. I WOULD FEEL SAFE TO SIT NEARBY THESE FOREIGNERS WHO HAD TEST NEGATIVE to board the flight. Test negative for COVID-19 is a must to travel to another country that is not your home.

• 

  The last and front rows are always the best

• 

  Seat arrangement between London-Singapore

Layover in Singapore. It was very unfortunate that I had 8 hours of layover in Singapore. All passengers were disembarked row by row, about 3-5 rows at a time. Those who transited at Changi Airport were well directed by a guide to the transit hall. TEMPERATURE WAS TAKEN as soon as you disembark, and BEFORE ENTERING THE transit HALL. Wrist bands were given to identify us as layover passengers. There, we were not allowed to move around like in London. If you want to eat and shop, you need to order online (there is a banner instructing how to do so). Duty-free shopping need to be placed at least 8 or 12 hours in advance. I THINK THIS IS WHY SINGAPORE COULD CONTAIN COVID-19 TRANSMISSION and or imported CASES. To avoid a close contact with other passengers, I located myself somewhere at the corner of the hall.

Advertisements

• 

  Checking temperature upon disembarking at Changi Airport

• 

  Airport staff giving wrist bands

• 

  Checking temperature before sending into the transit hall

• 

  Transit hall at Changi Airport

• 

  Instruction how to order food online

• 

  There is an app to place an order for duty-free shopping

• 

  Toilet inside the transit hall at Changi Airport equipped with disinfection spray and hand sanitiser

• 

  Wrist band given to transfer passengers

SINGAPORE-CAMBODIA: Before boarding, we were again asked to queue about 10-20 passengers each line with at least 1 m apart. They rechecked our temperature. A number of Cambodian flocks flown (mostly) from Malaysia joined us. The guide/staff navigated and led group by group to the security check. AGAIN, We were given health kit as we board. But, UPON BOARDING I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE AIRLINE (Silk Air, a regional subsidiary of Singapore Airlines) did not follow the long-haul flight standard mentioned above. All seats were occupied except three rows left empty as the flight attendant told me that they reserved for quarantine or in case if anyone gets sick they would isolate him or her there. I AM DISAPPOINTED that we were asked to stay apart during the transit but HAD TO PACK US TOGETHER in a tinny Airplane. EVEN MASKS are still compulsory, but we sit close to each other. From HERE YOU DO NOY TRUST your CAMBODIAN FELLOWS since, like me, THEY DIDN’T COVID-19-Free certificate. IT seems Singapore does not care when they send travellers out of their country. THIS MIGHT BE THE CAUSE of COVID-19 transmission and importing CASES to CAMBODIA. The Government of Cambodia should instruct incoming flights to follow space inside the plane.

• 

  Queuing before proceeding to security check. Many Cambodian flocks from Malaysia joined us (Crowded)

• 

  Airport staff were directing us to walk line by line

• 

  A Changi staff guiding us to the security check, about 20 passengers were behind me

FOOD dining is the most CONTAGIOUS time in this small flight. When foods and drinks were served, everyone removed masks and dug in. THIS IS a risky time, but I DID NOT EAT UNTIL the nearby passengers ate. BUT, I WAS LUCKY ENOUGH TO SIT NEXT TO A FOREIGNER. AS I TOLD YOU BEFORE, THEY WERE ONCE TESTED NEGATIVE up to 72 hours before boarding the flight.

Food and drink served Singapore-Phnom Penh

LANDING in PHNOM PENH. Again, DISAPPOINTED since passengers compete to get out of the plane, and the cabin crews did not advise them to disembark row by row like the long-haul flight. NO SOCIAL DISTANCING at all.

Passengers were about to disembark

IMMIGRATION CHECK and COVID-19 TESTING. I think many have written on this aspect, I should not spend more time on this. We had to fill out health status and condition and presented to the Health Officer to inspect. AGAIN, WE NEED TO line up, and there was no social distancing practice (by passengers). YOU KNOW THAT THE AIRPORT IS SMALL; it cannot follow Singapore. From there you will be given a form to fill out your choice of QUARANTINE ACCOMMODATIONs: Free and private hotel. In the form, you must include your personal info, and contact information (phone and e-mail). As I once heard about the condition of free accommodation, I CHOSE HOTEL as I will need to work during this period. AS I SAID BEFORE, it is a must now that all passengers are required to quarantine 14 days at the hotel and the free accommodation, not two days to get the test result and check out to quarantine yourself at home.

Advertisements

• 

  Customs declaration card

• 

  Health status and declaration card

• 

  Arrival immigrant card

• 

  Toilet inside PP International Airport: No hand sanitiser or a disinfection spray

I proceeded to collect my baggage and presented the health information form to the doctors who interviewed where about I would stay after the quarantine period (part of the contact tracing).  From there, samples were taken from your mouth and noise. You will be asked to remove your face mask. Upon the samples were taken, you must wear you mask immediately as I believe it is where people were asked unmask; it can be a CONTAGIOUS area. DON’T be scared, ALL DOCTORS and OFFICERs were equipped with Personal Protection Equipment’s (PPE).

Waiting to be transferred to the hotel by a bus

Transferring to the hotel was complicated as well. AGAIN, NO SOCIAL DISTANCING AT ALL. It was confusing as not many officers could speak English well. Some foreigners joined different queues: hotel and free accommodation. It took about 2 hours to get ready on the bus to the hotel. Both foreigners and Khmer passengers were frustrated with the arrangement. I THINK IT IS TYPICAL BUSINESS AS USUAL IN THIS COUNTRY.

I will tell you more how I felt when I was transferred to the hotel. It is again a typical thing. Stay tuned!

If you have questions, please comment and I will respond.

The Unpredictable Way of Pandemics in Global Politics

Sorpong Peou | Ryerson University | Canada

I am not an epidemiologist or a virologist, nor am I a medical scientist of any sort, but my interest in pandemics is based on my understanding that they have emerged as a source of threat to peace and security on different levels: human, national, and international. Pandemics can indeed threaten global peace and security. From my perspective, the way of pandemic is still largely unpredictable.

This does not mean social scientists can’t predict or theorize about some of the effects of epidemics and pandemics on our world, which include the following: the Antoine Plague of 165-180, the Black Death of 1347–53, avian influenza (i.e., the bird flu, caused by a virus, such as the Spanish Flu of 1918-20 and the Swine Flu of 2009), and corona-viruses (such as SARS of 2003 and COVID-19 of 2020).

Epidemics and pandemics are killers. The Antoine Plague (165-180 AD) killed a third of the Roman Empire’s population. The Plague of Justinian (541 AD), which spread across Asia, North Africa, Arabia and Europe, killed between 25 and 50 million people. The Black Death killed approximately 25 million people, almost one-third of Europe’s population. The 1918-1920 Spanish Flu infected 500 million people, about one-third of the world’s population, and killed at least 50 million people. The Swine Flu of 2009 killed between 151,000 and 575,000 people worldwide. Corona-viruses are also killers. The SARS pandemic reportedly infected 8,098 and left 774 people dead, but the COVID-19 has been more devastating: having infected close to 2 million people in a matter of several months and left more than 100,000 dead.

On one level, we can say that pandemics pose a threat to human security: they kill people, but we don’t really know when exactly and from where the next one will strike. So far, Asia has been a region where some big pandemics originated: the Black Death (China and Inner Asia), avian influenza (i.e., the 1957-58 Asian Flu, the 1968-69 Hong Kong Flu, and the 1997 Bird Flu). The last two corona-viruses also broke out in Asia: SARS (China) and COVID-19 (China). But pandemics also have a history of originating in other regions: the Spanish Flu originated in Spain and the 2009 Swine Flu in Mexico. The first ever-recorded pandemic broke out in Athens, an ancient Greek state (known as the Plague of Athens around 430-426 B). The Antoine Plague swept through the Roman Empire. The Plague of Justinian may have started in Egypt. Thus, where the next pandemic will strike is hard to know.

The negative effects of COVID-19 on human security can be be identified when social-economic consequences are further assessed. According to ILO Director-General Guy Ryder who spoke early in April 2020, the economic effects of this pandemic could exceed the global financial crisis in 2008 and could result in a loss of closer to 200 million jobs within the next several months.

On another level, epidemics and pandemics can also threaten national and international security in different ways. Firstly, they may have devastating consequences for states and societies in that they can produce domestic instability, civil war, or even civil-military conflict. Price-Smith (2002), for instance, puts it this way, “the potential for intra-elite violence is increasingly probable and may carry grave political consequences, such as coups, the collapse of government, and planned genocides.”

Secondly, both epidemics and pandemics may also result in disputes between or among states because of potential disagreement over appropriate policy responses. For instance, this new round of China-U.S. tension is related to COVID-19, and some observers think that the pandemic has the potential to cause a military confrontation or even a Cold War between the two world powers.

Thirdly, they may alter the balance of power between competitive states within the international security system and lead to conflict. The diminished size of a population may provide a greater incentive for some state or a social group unaffected by a pandemic to attempt military conquest. The Antoine Plague (165-180 AD), for instance, swept through the Roman Empire and devastated its armies. A recent example of how a pandemic might affect the balance of power is when COVID-19 infected more than 580 sailors of a 4,865-person crew aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt, a US aircraft carrier deployed to the Pacific Ocean and docked on March 27. Another recent development was when some 50 crew members aboard Charles de Gaulle (France’s only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) were positive.

Fourthly, epidemics and pandemics may also alter the outcome of international conflict. For instance, Sparta defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431 BC – 404 BC), not only because of Sparta’s military might but also because of an epidemic that broke out in Athens around around 430 B.C. and killed between one-third and two-thirds of the Athenian population.

While history can help shed some light on the dangerous effects of pandemics in global politics, it’s important to bear in mind that they remain unpredictable. They are killers for sure and may or may not cause domestic instability and violent conflict when states and societies suffer from economic, financial, and political crises, but a world war or a Cold War is very unlikely nor is it inevitable.

Much still depends on what states and their peoples choose to do. The threat of a great pandemic like COVID-19 may bring them together. Sometimes there is nothing more unifying a popularized world than a common foe, but a dangerous pandemic may also drive them apart as some evidence may suggest, especially when state leaders blame each other or when some of them exploit this global threat to advance their own geo-strategic interests and pursue their own political ambitions.

This is a possible thesis topic! Share your thoughts with me if you think otherwise. I will share more of my arguments on this topic in my book to be published someday, hopefully sooner rather than later.

Sorpong Peou is Full Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University and a member of the Yeates School of Graduate Studies. He was formerly Chair of the Department of Political Science, University of Winnipeg (Manitoba), and Chair of the Advisory and Recruitment Committee for The Manitoba Chair of Global Governance Studies – a joint program between the University of Winnipeg and the University of Manitoba. His major books include Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes (World Scientific and Imperial College Press, 2014); Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific (Praeger 2010), Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action, ed. (Routledge 2008), International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding: Cambodia and Beyond (Palgrave Macmillan 2007), Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Toward Democracy (St. Martin’s Press, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Silkworms, 2001); and Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-box (Oxford University Press, 1997).

This article was originally published by his personal page: http://www.sorpongpeou.com on April 13, 2020

Economic development and cultural genocide in Cambodia

Listen to audio

Frédéric Bourdier | Anthropologist | IRD France

Cambodia is home to 24 Indigenous peoples speaking Mon-Khmer and Austronesian languages. Numerically important groups are the Tampuan, the Kuy, the Bunong, the Jarai, the Brao and the Kreung. While the exact population of these ethnic groups is controversial, they constitute about 2-3% of the national population, between 350,000 and 400,000 individuals as of 2020. Some recuse their ethnic identity because of social discrimination, intermarriage, migration, urbanization and diverse processes of acculturation. Indigenous people’s territories are scattered in 15 provinces (out of 24), but a majority is located in the three north-eastern provinces (Preah Vihear, Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri). While they are not disaggregated in the national census, human right groups maintain that Indigenous Peoples face discrimination and coerced displacement from their lands that is extinguishing them as distinct groups. Scientific investigations confirm that these patterns are driven by ongoing state and transnational corporate ventures for resource extraction and land conversion (timber, minerals, hydro, and agro-industrial plantations), coupled with the growing in-migration from other parts of the country. National authorities regularly deny these assertions under the guise of an expected “national economic development for all”.

It is admitted that the principal adversaries of indigenous territorial and land claims in Cambodia, and by extension throughout the world, are the protagonists of a neo-liberal economic model that has impoverished and dispossessed major sectors of rural societies, blocked the improvement of locally based production (subsistence and commercial agriculture), and promoted capitalist expansion by excluding local populations. In the absence of any reliable mechanisms to secure land, many of the fertile and forested areas, traditionally occupied by autochthonous groups, started to be coveted by agribusiness companies, multinational consortia and wealthy politicians for monoculture exploitation: rubber, cassava, and cashew (north-east), sugarcane and corn (north).

Funeral ceremony, Andong Meas district, Rattanakiri. Photo by Frédéric Bourdier

After a decade of Vietnamese occupation, Cambodia has followed a free-market ideology. In the 1990s, Cambodia’s economy relied on external financial support, but socio-political elites constantly captured the bilateral/multilateral aid from the West. Insufficient allocation redistribution for the general population and feebleness of public services reinforced social and economic inequalities. Furthermore, the 2001 Land Law, a by-product of Western aid, with improved additional legislations for monitoring Economic Land Concessions sanctioned by the sub-decree in 2005, offered legal tools for granting Economic Land Concessions to national and international (joint-venture) companies, even though Article 29 of the same Land Law states that “no authority outside the community may acquire rights to immovable properties belonging to indigenous communities”. Indigenous Peoples expected that the 2002 Forest Law would lead to a substantive remedy for protecting their lands, but it led to the contrary (extensive logging by officials and local Khmer/Indigenous elites). In 2004, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia ratified a Master Plan, of which Ratanakiri Province was the epicentre. Once a remote area, nearly exclusively inhabited by non-Khmer populations, the province became a destination not only for landless migrants but also for politically connected opportunists, absentee landlords, and foreign corporations, due to its geostrategic position, Cambodia-Vietnam borderland region with fertile basaltic soils.

Advertisements

Illegal logging with the complicity of military forces, Ratanakiri. Photo by Frédéric Bourdier

Leading developers/policy-decision makers keep on arguing that Indigenous peoples have to adapt to the contemporary economic world. Cambodia has to be competitive and must attract Foreign Direct Investment to advance the country’s economy as well as to modernize rural areas like the north-eastern provinces. Megaprojects constitute the ongoing skeleton of modernity. Subsistence agriculture and worse again slash and burn cultivation are mere testimonies of the past that can be confined to local places (for ecotourism purposes, under the label of cultural heritage) but which cannot contribute to the economic growth of the Kingdom. Land concentration restricts small scale ownership but, according to national authorities, will contribute to maintaining labour forces, providing Indigenous peasants “reasonable” daily wagers.

Dispossessed indigenous families work for a rubber plantation in Bokeo, Ratanakiri. Photo by Frédéric Bourdier

Working for others has always existed in a context of exchange of services among indigenous groups. Reciprocity conditions its acceptability. But the idea to be permanently or even seasonally employed is less conceivable, even for the Indigenous farmers having small plantations who prefer to recruit lowland workers. Disinterest for agrarian paid work in the plantation prevails. A job with restricting hours appears incongruous and unthinkable to the vast majority, except for the Indigenous landless families who have no other option. As a result, investors and companies recruit experienced Khmer and Cham from the lowland valley to work in their plantations located in indigenous territories. These skilful in-migrants and workforces decide to settle permanently (more jobs, better weather, less pollution, the myth of “abundance of nature”), and these, therefore, contributed not only to land speculation and socio-ecological conflicts but also exacerbated tensions between autochthonous people and new business-minded settlers. This new population have in turn convinced relatives and friends to flock into the indigenous people’s territories for lucrative business opportunities, opening small businesses, being seasonal workers, suppliers and contractors, or elaborating a partnership for a development project (transport/delivery services, construction, training, collective land acquisition).

Frédéric Bourdier is a senior anthropologist from the national scientific research centre from France (Research Institute for Development: IRD) and the University of Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne. He started conducting ethnographic work in Cambodia (1994-1995), with the aim to compare the social ecology of various autochthonous communities in Ratanakiri Province – Tampuan, Kachok’ and Jarai. Since 2004, he came back to the Kingdom (after ten years spent in Brazil Amazon, South India, Columbia, China and Cuba). He has been in charge of two programmes focussing on health policies and the socio-political mobilisation of the civil society in the fight against HIV/AIDS. He has been also involved in an ethnogenetic program in the Highlands, in a critical research insisting on the impacts of development on the livelihoods of the forest peoples. After being in charge of an interdisciplinary malaria research, an ethno-historical investigation of the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Ratanakiri in the sixties, he is actually organising anthropological surveys of the green economy in Cambodia. He periodically returns to Ratanakiri in the villages where he previously lived.

Citation: Bourdier, F (2020). Economic development and cultural genocide in Cambodia. Insights on Southeast Asia. Retrieved from https://sea-insights.com/2020/11/30/economic-development-and-cultural-genocide-in-cambodia/

How Chinese investors build patron and client networks to secure their investment in Cambodia

Sokphea Young |University College London|UK

This piece explains: i) how the new generation of Chinese investors and companies acquire licenses in a host country of a predominant Sino-diaspora community, and ii) how these Chinese investors and companies instill patron-client networks to influence regulations and secure business in the host country. It will address these topics by drawing on existing literature, field interviews and observation. It will begin with a brief overview of the relations between China and Cambodia, and other Western count parts. It will then illustrate how Chinese aid and trade have been playing a significant role in Cambodian business and regulatory frameworks by drawing on political culture and patronage-clientelism concepts.

Chinese diaspora and China’s relation within Cambodia

Contemporary Cambodia-China relations can be traced back to just before the collapse of the French protectorate in Indochina. In September 1947, China established its Phnom Penh consulate^[1] although the first generation of Chinese migrants probably began settling in Cambodia as early as the late 12^th century when Zhou Daguan visited the Khmer Angkorian Empire. In the early 1950s, there were approximately 3,000 Chinese living in Phnom Penh alone^[2]. As a business strategy, the Chinese migrants established good connections with Cambodians who were wealthy or were officials working for the French administration. Since then, the ties between Chinese migrants and Cambodian elites has become entrenched and been maintained, up to and including the current younger generation^[3]. This has shaped how the younger Chinese generations in Cambodia, commonly known as Sino-Khmer or Sino-Cambodia, operate their small and large-businesses in the country.

Advertisements

Politically, following the collapse of the French protectorate in 1953, the leaders of the two countries (Zhou Enlai and Norodom Sihanouk) met in 1955 at the Bandung conference, where their relationship became closer^[4]. Due to geopolitical turbulence and intervention, especially by the US War with Vietnam—which trampled the neighbouring countries of Cambodia and Laos—the region became engulfed by civil war. Beginning in the early 1970s, when Nororom Sihanouk was deposed by a coup orchestrated by the pro-US General Lon Nol of Cambodia, the relationship between China and Cambodia become volatile, even though Shihanouk’s tie with China remained the same. After defeating the pro-US government, the Khmer Rouge’s communists re-established the bilateral relationship with China, from 1975 until 1979, and maintained contact until their surrender in the last battle in 1998. China then re-established a relationship with the new government that emerged from the United Nations organised-election in 1993.

After the election, there was an influx of European and US trade and aid into Cambodia (similar to what occurred in Myanmar after their 2015 election). The inflow of Chinese aid and trade did not draw much attention from the US and EU donors until the 2010s, when China’s economy surpassed some of the world biggest economies, and when China’s Belt and Road Initiative officially launched in 2013. Compared to other donors, the EU had been the most generous donor in terms of grants, followed by NGO core funding, and the US. But as of 2010, China alone is the biggest donor to Cambodia (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Foreign aid to Cambodia (US$ million)^[5]

Following the 1998 elections, Cambodia reformed its economy by amending investment laws and regulations to attract foreign capital as well as to integrate Cambodia into the region, and into the larger global economy. Cambodia’s trade with the US has benefited from the granting of a “Generalised System of Preference”, which allows the country to export duty-free products into the US market. Because of this, a huge number of garment factories were opened and operated within Cambodia. In 2001, Cambodia was listed as a least developing country, able to receive the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preference, which allowed Cambodia to export products to EU countries, tariff and quota-free. The inflow of foreign capital also increased significantly starting in the early 2010s, from around US$800 million in 2010, to more than US$1billion in 2012-13, and US$3.5 billion in 2018 (Figure 2). While intra-ASEAN investments played a significant part in this rapid inflow of capital, China alone has provided approximately 20.40% of total foreign investment to Cambodia, and has thus become the single most important strategic investment partner to Cambodia.

Figure 2: Total foreign investment to Cambodia (US$ million)^[6]. 

However, Cambodia has been ranked low in ease of doing business enabling environment ranking, placed at 138^th out of 190^th (World Bank, 2019)^[7]. The enforcement of regulations is generally weak and uncertain, as admitted by investors^[8],[9]. This has caused obstacles for most Western investors, but not for China. Since 2005, the inflow of Chinese investment exploits the government’s economic policies, including the privatisation of public resources, such as land, water, forest, and mines, by endorsing a number of regulations, such as the economic land concession (ELC) in 2005^[10]. Foreign investors, including the Chinese, have flocked to Cambodia to acquire licenses for resource extraction. Investing in real estate has also been popular among Chinese individual investors and companies. One of the most popular areas is the coastal area is Sihanouk province, where casino and real estate are owned predominately by Chinese businessmen. These investments, though not all, often sparked grassroots communities’ reaction against the regulatory enforcement of license permits^[11].

Advertisements

Cambodia’s socio-political culture, patronage and clientelism

The uncertainty in Cambodia’s regulatory enforcement appears to oppose the deregulation or race to the bottom theories (which enabled the inflow of foreign investment). This uncertainty instead seems to encourage multinational corporations, not only from China but now also from European countries, though China still predominates. How do these Chinese companies: i) acquire investment licenses; ii) secure their business operations over a long-term period; and iii) cope with risks in the uncertain regulatory enforcement environment? Based on my observation and case studies, these questions can be addressed through a careful study of Cambodia’s socio-political culture in relation to an entrenched patronage and client network.

Both clientelism and patronage imply the politically motivated distribution of favours that aims to promote personal and political interests. The two terms are often combined when speaking of patron-client relationship, which can be understood as a dyadic tie involving a largely instrumental friendship[12]. In this friendship, an individual of higher socio-economic status (the patron) uses their own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (the client) who, for their part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance to the patron. Developing a clientelist network is a means by which to gain protection and achieve goals in a situation of societal uncertainty created by public institutions which may behave in ways that are not predictable.

Patron-client network has been generally accepted by Cambodia’s political culture, having the ruler as the central patron of the neo-patrimonial regime. Characterising Hun Sen as a man of prowess, scholars assert that he has remained in power because he is culturally perceived as a man possessing merit or bunn, which can be translated to power[13]. In essence, all decision-making must be referred to the patrons of the regime (having Hun Sen as chair or central patron).

To maintain their patronage system, the patron of the regime has, since the early 1990s, not only awarded lucrative positions to clients, but also allocated natural resources[14]. For instance, the awarding of licences for resource extraction (mining, oil, agricultural land, commercial forest logging and energy) and the privatising of state properties has been given to those individuals who support and are loyal to the ruling party (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: A model of Chinese investors operating in Cambodia

Generally, government officials seek lucrative positions and use their positions to extract rent. These appointments are not made freely, but based on rents. As the rent increases, so does the price of the position. In so doing, the allocation of lucrative positions is subject to (invisible) auctions and competition within the network, and relies on connections with the patrons and the ruling party. “They have to pay a certain amount of money to secure their position.”^[15] If someone, in addition to his or her popularity, dares to pay more or contribute more to the party’s patrons, they will be offered the position. To ensure access to ministries with authority over resources and power, including lucrative sectors, a strong network is highly necessary[16].

The foregoing political culture of doing internal business in Cambodia has become a contact point of the foreign investors. Foreign investors (the clients) need powerful politico-commercial officials (the middle patrons) to support long-term business operations in Cambodia, where lax regulation enforcement and an uncertain business environment persistently prevail (Young, 2016), see figure 3. The network of middle patrons and client (foreign investors) is installed through one of two pathways: being a local joint venture partner, or being a broker who later becomes a local partner. Without these pathways, it is extremely difficult for foreign investors to get access to natural resources^[17]; no business can enjoy the medium term in Cambodia without connecting to the patron’s affiliates. Through joint ventures with local reliable and powerful businesspersons, foreign investors can be granted ELCs and secure long-term successful investments. If there is no such relationship, foreign investors will not be able to access the resources. If there is no powerful local partner, foreign investors are likely to face high risk and fail in securing an ELC or long-term investments.^[18] For example, a Chinese state-owned company, Fuchan and China Cooperative State Farm Group, partnered with Cambodian Pheapimex to develop agricultural plantations in the north-eastern province of Mondulkiri, and in Kampong Chhnang and Pursat provinces; such an arrangement caused adverse impacts on the socio-economic conditions of the local communities, including displacement, loss of access to natural resources and land, food insecurity and impoverishment[19]. These investments have nevertheless been secured in Cambodia through a joint venture between Chinese investors and Cambodian magnates, dominated by Sino-Khmers[20]. In this instance, this patron-client network has been installed not only within the government administration, but also between these politico-commercial elites and foreign investors or investment projects in Cambodia. Another pathway is through a broker (or licence trader) who later becomes a local joint venture partner. Foreign investors have to find a local broker who is powerful and has strong connections with senior government officials in order to facilitate the process of requesting ELCs. The foreign investors have to pay a substantial amount that is not indicated in the regulations. On receiving ELC licences, foreign investors have to allocate some number of shares to the broker free of charge^[21] and then the broker becomes a local partner to protect the business operation. Otherwise, other corrupt or influential senior government officials might intrude into the business during its operations.^[22] In so doing, the domestic partners become middle patrons of the foreign investors (the clients). The patrons have an obligation to protect the client in return for rent; for example, confronting allegations from affected communities, activists and NGOs.

In a case of Sino-Khmer who facilitated Chinese investment in Cambodia, a senior government official unveils that “… They, the foreign investors, do not know the entry point for investment in Cambodia, where to go and how to process the legal documents.”^[23] Such a process is confirmed by a legal advisor who facilitates access to granting ELC licences. She argues that if investors had no connection and wanted to follow the procedure stated in the concession regulatory framework, the concerned ministries of the government would not be available to talk and work with them. Investors have to seek local investors or facilitators/brokers who are powerful and have strong connection with powerful officials to get an ELC approved within a short-period, although they have to pay transition fees^[24]. She pointed out that: “Newcomers [investors] … find someone who has good networks and relationships, and the process of granting licence goes smoothly…”^[25]

In this case, by connecting with a local Sino-tycoon, it took a Chinese foreign investor only three months to obtain from the council of ministers (CoM),^[26] much faster than for most companies. Acting on this advantage, the joint company did not conduct proper public consultation or social and environmental impact assessments (EIA|), as required by the sub-decrees of economic concession (2005), Land Law (2001) and EIA (1999), before approval by the CoM. This concession is thus accused of violating these regulations. As stated in the Land Law, no concession is granted to a private company of greater than 10,000 hectares. This agro-sugar industrial investment was, however, awarded up to 19,100 hectares, as it claimed to be two companies but was, in fact, operating as a single company.^[27] This case has suggested how a local Sino-Khmer could influence regulatory process in doing and securing business in Cambodia in the amid of rampant protests of the civil society organisations and the affected communities.

Conclusion

With long historical migration, business and diplomatic relations between the two countries, the influx of new generations of Chinese foreign investments and aid to Cambodia is the by-product of geopolitical expansion, but complementing both the host and foreign country’s political economic interests. The continuance of Chinese investment to Cambodia’s least favorable business environment has been secured and maintained as new Chinese investors have exploited socio-political cultural practices instilled by older generations of Sino-Khmer (tracing back to the 12^th century, and very clearly from the end of the French protectorate era in Cambodia). Cambodia’s long established clientelism and patronage culture are seen as a mesh network, within which the stronger influence the weaker, and both share reciprocal but not always equal benefits. This culture has influenced regulatory enforcement and become an invisible form of business regulatory practice in Cambodia, where their ruler, also known as the patron at the apex of the pyramid, has been in power for decades. The patron, the middle-patron and the client (including the new generation of Chinese investors) become what is called “paralegal” mediating and easing doing business in the host country’s ambiguous regulatory enforcement environment. The ability to embrace and adopt the entrenched patron-client networks in the host country is a powerful weapon to ensure and secure long-term business operations (generally enabled by high-level bilateral diplomatic and political economic relations).  

---

^[1] Chanda Nayan, China and Cambodia: In the mirror of history, 9(2), Asia Pacific Review, 1, 11 (2002).

^[2] Groslier, 1958 cited in Chin J.K. (2017) Ethnicized Networks and Local Embeddedness: The New Chinese Migrant Community in Cambodia. In: Zhou M. (eds) Contemporary Chinese Diasporas. Palgrave, Singapore

^[3] Nyíri Pál. Investors, managers, brokers, and culture workers: How the” New” Chinese are changing the meaning of Chineseness in Cambodia, 1(2), Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, 369-397 (2012)

^[4] Chanda (2002)

^[5] CDC (Council for the Development of Cambodia). 2018. Development Cooperation and Partnerships Report. Phnom Penh: CDC, available at http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/dcpr_images/docs/english.pdf (accessed 24 August 2019)

^[6] ASEA Statistic: https://data.aseanstats.org/fdi-by-hosts-and-sources (accessed 02 September 2019)

^[7] World Bank (2019). Doing Business 2019: Training for reform, economy profile Cambodia. https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/c/cambodia/KHM.pdf (accessed September 03, 2019).

^[8] Subedi Surya P Land rights in countries in transition: A case study of human rights impact of economic land concessions in Cambodia. In Asian Yearbook of International Law, 1, 46 (2018). Brill Nijhoff.

^[9] Young Sokphea, Movement of indigenous communities targeting an agro-industrial investment in North-Eastern Cambodia 44 (1.2), Asian Journal of Social Science 187, 213 (2016).

^[10] Subedi (2018)

^[11] Young Sokphea, Protests, Regulations, and Environmental Accountability in Cambodia 38(1), Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33, 54 (2019)

[12] Scott, James, The erosion of patron-client bonds and social change in rural Southeast Asia 32(01). The Journal of Asian Studies, 5, 37 (1972).

[13] Jacobsen Trude & Stuart-Fox Martin, Power and political culture in Cambodia Working Paper 200. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore (2013).

[14] Hughes Caroline. Political economy of the Cambodian transition (2003). London: Routledge.

^[15] An interview with a member of parliament and standing committee of the party (18 Dec 2013)

[16] Hughes Caroline & Conway Tim, Understanding pro-poor political change: The policy process–Cambodia (2004). London: Overseas Development Institute.

^[17] Senior legal advisor (09 Dec 2013); a company Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (18 Dec 2013) & ELC general manager (27 Nov 2013)

^[18] ELC general manager (27 Nov 2013) & Senior legal advisor (09 Dec 2013).

[19] Un Kheang, China’s foreign investment and assistance: Implications for Cambodia’ development and democratization16(2) Peace & Conflict Studies, 65, 81 (2009).

[20] Un Kheang (2009)

^[21] A deputy provincial governor (15 Dec 2013) confessed that foreign investors allocate certain shares to their Cambodian brokers and they later become local partners.

^[22] A CEO (18 Dec 2013) & ELC general manager (27 Nov 2013).

^[23] A deputy provincial governor (15 Dec 2013).

^[24] NGO deputy director (20 Dec 2013) & senior legal advisor (09 Dec 2013)

^[25] Senior legal advisor (09 Dec 2013).

^[26] The licence is approved by the council of minister in the form of a notification (sor chor nor in Khmer), which is usually exaggerated by companies and local and provincial authorities as a ‘law’ or chbab.

^[27] NGO lawyer (20 Dec 2013).

Citation: Young, S. (2020). How Chinese Investors build patron and client networks to secure their investment in Cambodia. Insights on Southeast Asia. Retrieved from https://sea-insights.com/2020/11/18/how-chinese-investors-build-patron-and-client-networks-to-secure-their-investment-in-cambodia/(opens in a new tab)

Advertisements

MA & PhD Studentship in Korean Studies

The Graduate School of Korean Studies in the Academy of Korean Studies is a government-funded institution established to develop and globalise Korean studies. It brings together 50 faculty members and 250 students, a half of whom are international from 33 countries, to create an open and dynamic community to widen and deepen their knowledge in the fields of humanities and social sciences pertinent to Korea.

Programs

– Master’s degree
– Doctoral degree
– Research(non-degree)

Majors

– Korean History
– Diplomatics and Bibliography
– Philosophy
– Korean Linguistics·Korean Literature
– Anthropology·Folklore
– Religious Studies
– Musicology
– Art History
– Cultural Informatics·Human Geography
– Political Science
– Sociology
– Education
– Korean Culture and Society

Benefits for International Students

– Tuition fees are fully waived for the whole coursework period.
– About 70% of international students are provided with the Government Grant, a monthly stipend of ￡460.
– A 5:1 student-faculty ratio enables close one-on-one guidance.
– Korean language courses, tutoring, writing clinic, and various cultural activities are available free of charge, supporting students’ academic performance.

Requirements

– English language proficiency equivalent to or higher than TOEFL iBT 80, IELTS Academic Module 6.5, or TEPS 301 for applicants for Korean Culture and Society major
– Korean language proficiency equivalent to or higher than TOPIK(Test of Proficiency in Korean) level 4 for applicants except for Korean Culture and Society major

Application 
Applications are open on 24th September and close on 8th October 2021. Please apply online at gradaks.recruiter.co.kr

Why Study at GSKS? 

As an educational institute established and funded by the Korean government with the aim of promoting Korean studies, we provide international students with excellent educational and living environments as follows: 

• Tuition fees are fully waived for the whole coursework period for all international students.
• 69.8% of international students benefit from the Government Grant, a monthly stipend of ￡460 for a year, renewable upon evaluation.
• A 5:1 student-faculty ratio enables close one-to-one guidance by professors.
• Korean language courses are available free of charge to assist international students with academic writing, presentations, and discussions.
• Various programs such as tutoring, writing clinic, cultural activities and airfare subsidy for presentation abroad, etc. support students’ academic performance. 

Currently, approximately 250 students including about 120 international students from 33 countries are enrolled in our Master’s or doctoral degree program in the fields of humanities and social sciences pertinent to Korea.  

The Program 

• Coursework period is 2 years for a Master’s degree program and 3 years for a doctoral degree program.
• An academic year consists of two semesters and courses are provided for 15 weeks per semester. A spring semester begins in March, and a fall semester in September.
• Most courses are taught in Korean, while courses in Korean Culture and Society major are provided in English.
• Students earn 3 credits each course. In order to graduate, students of a Master’s degree program should complete 24 credits, and a doctoral degree program 36 credits, other than mandatory Korean language courses which are non-credit. Both Master’s degree and doctoral degree students should write a thesis. 

Entry Requirement 

• A keen interest in Korean studies, coupled with an undergraduate degree (for a Master’s degree program) or a graduate degree (for a doctoral degree program)
• English language proficiency equivalent to or higher than TOEFL iBT 80, IELTS Academic Module 6.5, or TEPS 301 for applicants for Korean Culture and Society major
• Korean language proficiency equivalent to or higher than TOPIK(Test of Proficiency in Korean) level 4 for applicants except for Korean Culture and Society major 

Application Deadline 

Applications are sought twice a year. Application for 2022 spring semester will be open on 24 September and close on 8 October 2021. Applications for 2022 fall semester will be sought in March 2022.

How to Apply 

To apply, visit here and complete the online application form. A soft copy or a scanned copy of the following documents should be uploaded on the application website:

• Personal Statement
• Research Plan
• A graduation certificate and official transcripts
• A score report of TOFEL iBT, IELTS Academic Module, or TEPS (if applicable)
• A TOPIK certificate (if applicable) 

In addition, a letter of recommendation should be sent by email. 

Selection Process 

• 1st Process (If applicable) : Korean Language Proficiency Test

–    If applicants do not submit a valid TOPIK score certificate, GSKS Korean language teachers conduct a phone interview to test their Korean language proficiency.

–    Applicants for Korean Culture and Society major are not applicable.

• 2nd Process : Document Screening

–    Document screening is held for applicants who meet all the application requirement.

–    Overall evaluation of applicants’ research plan, academic ability, language proficiency, and academic background (shown in personal statement and a recommendation letter) takes place. 

• 3rd Process : A Video Interview

–    A video interview is held to those who have passed the 2nd process. 

Contact Us 

If you have any queries about the program or the application process, please contact us at admission_intl@aks.ac.kr or +82-31-730-8183. 

TYPE / ROLE 

Master’s Degree or Doctoral Degree Program 

SUBJECT AREAS 

• Korean History
• Diplomatics and Bibliography
• Philosophy
• Korean Linguistics · Korean Literature
• Anthropology · Folklore
• Religious Studies
• Musicology
• Art History
• Cultural Informatics · Human Geography
• Political Science
• Sociology
• Education
• Korean Culture and Society (Only available for Master’s degree program) 

LOCATION 

Seongnam City – South Korea 

Perched on the side of Cheonggye Mountain, 30km south of the center of Seoul, the campus provides a fantastic setting for the academic pursuits of students with its peaceful atmospheres and natural environments. Also, students can reach dynamic youth culture of Gangnam area within 30 minutes by bus as well as artistic and historic heritage of Seoul city center within an hour

Click here to find out more and fill in application.

NIAS seeks to host applicants for Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellowships

The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) based at the University of Copenhagen is issuing a call for interested candidates seeking support to submit a Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellowship. These EU-funded Fellowships:

·       are open to researchers moving within Europe, as well as those coming to Europe from other parts of the world.

·       can restart a research career after a break, such as parental leave.

·       can help researchers coming back to Europe find a new position.

To apply, you will need a completed PhD, a very strong academic profile and a research proposal of up to ten pages, in a field involving Asian studies.

The scheme is very competitive: review scores of over 90% are typically required to secure funding.

The call opened on 22 June 2021, with a deadline expected on 12 October 2021.

Results will be available in by March 2022, with the earliest expected Fellowship start dates being 1 August 2022.

NIAS is a regional institute established in 1968, with its own academic press and library services. Administratively, it is located within the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (see www.nias.ku.dk).

NIAS supports work in all areas of Asian studies across the social sciences and humanities, but has particular strengths on East and Southeast Asia. Special areas of current interest include, but are not limited to:

·       Climate and sustainability

·       Comparative politics

·       International relations, especially relations between the Nordic region and Asia

·       Gender

·       Digital media

Because this scheme supports mobility, applicants presently based in Denmark or those who have spent 12 months or more in Denmark over the last three years are not eligible.

Anyone interested in applying should send a CV and a two page outline research proposal to NIAS Director, Duncan McCargo, duncan(at)nias.ku.dk, as an initial expression of interest by 19 July 2021.

We will work intensively with selected applicants to review, prepare, refine and submit the final application, as hosts for a Marie Curie postdoctoral Fellowship. Please note that we do not hold any funding ourselves: we are simply making nominations to the programme, with no certainty of success.

Further information is available online:

https://ec.europa.eu/research/mariecurieactions/actions/postdoctoral-fellowships

Call for Contributions – Transformative Approaches in the Mekong Region (€350 allowance)

To explore new political viewpoints and to facilitate a sharing processes in the ASEAN region and towards Europe, the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Asia – Hanoi office is calling for contributions on the themes: (i) Social-Ecological Transformation, (ii) Climate Justice and (iii) Food Sovereignty. Please find attached the full document for more details and please help share this to relevant stakeholders.

The contributions can be of various types like academic papers, interviews, political analyses, picture series, comics etc. The selected papers will be published by the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung in a joint book in English and German language.

The final paper should be maximum 15,000 characters describing ideas, concepts or projects of a Social-Ecological Transformation and how they can transform the society. The contributions may focus on projects and concepts in the five Southeast Asian Mekong countries Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar.

Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Asia will support the editing and publishing of papers that are relevant for our themes and approaches. For each selected paper we will provide an allowance of 350 EUR net.

Advertisements

Process of submitting papers:

·         A first overview of the paper (maximum one page) should be sent before 6th of June 2021. Paper Selection will be finished by Mid-June

·         The full paper of maximum 15,000 characters should be sent before 15th of September 2021. Related Pictures would be highly valued.

Overviews and papers can be submitted via e-mail to Uyen.Tran@rosalux.org. If you have any inquiries, please do not hesitate to contact us via the above e-mail address.

Click here for the full call for contribution

Microfinance in Times of COVID-19 and Loan Restructuring Policy in Brief

Phasy RES

The Center for Khmer Studies

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers raised concerns about high levels of household over-indebtedness, questioning the relationship between debt and household vulnerability. In 2017, a sector-sponsored survey (N= 802) was conducted with household borrowers in 12 provinces and Phnom Penh, and it suggests that 28% of micro-finance household borrowers were insolvent, and another 22% were at risk (MFC and Good Return 2017). Concerning over-indebtedness, many researchers have pointed to several problems: land loss (Green 2018; Green & Bylander forthcoming), distressed migration (Bylander 2014; Ovesen and Trankell 2014; Green and Estes 2018; LICADHO 2020), and declining household nutrition through a reduction in food consumption (Seng 2018). COVID-19 pandemic, which induced economic slowdown and unemployment, has dramatically exacerbated vulnerable households’ livelihoods, especially micro-finance borrowers, in the country. Given these challenges, the World Bank (2020: 3) claims that “the global epidemiological and economic crisis unleashed by COVID-19 poses the greatest threat to Cambodia’s development in its 30 years of modern history.” The Bank continues, “poverty could increase between 3 to 11 percentage points from a 50 per cent income loss that lasts for six months for households engaged in tourism, wholesale and retail trade, garment, construction, or manufacturing.” In this essay, we attempt to briefly describe how the loan restructuring policy was enforced by financial institutions (FIs) and examine the extent to which this policy has benefited the debt-distressed or economically vulnerable households, and how they cope with the effects of the pandemic.

In response to COVID-19 induced economic crisis, loan restructuring policy or known in Khmer as Kareapcham Inatean Loeung Vinh or, in short, Inatean Saloueng Vinh policy, emerged. This directly follows a request by the government for leniency on debt-stressed borrowers impacted by the COVID-19. In March 2020, the Prime Minister of Cambodia called on financial institutions to be lenient towards borrowers and not to confiscate collateral assets from the debt-distressed households. Following the Prime Minister’s request, on 27 March 2020, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) issued a circular requesting banks and microfinance institutions to carry out a loan restructuring policy to relieve the debt burden of their clients whose incomes were adversely affected by the COVID-19.

To address the debt-distressed issues, NBC recommended nine options for the banks and financial institutions: 1) Reductions in the principal amount or the amount to be paid at maturity; 2) Reductions of the interest rate to a rate lower than in the original loan agreement; 3) Extension of time for the loan principal or interest repayment or interest capitalisation; 4) Extension of maturity; 5) Addition of and/or change of joint borrower or guarantor (if any); 6) Change in loan type from an instalment loan to a bullet loan; 7) Waiver of or reduction of collateral requirement; 8) Reduction of contract condition; and, 9) Provision of a grace period, which could last for six months counting from the effective date of the new contract.

To date, according to Cambodian Microfinance Association (CMA), there were USD 1.3 billion worth of total loans being restructured or around 16 per cent of total outstanding loans in 2020. As of December 2020, 271,117 borrowers (about 12 per cent of the total number of borrowing households) have benefited from some forms of loan restructuring. The CMA and Association of Banks in Cambodia then called on the NBC to extend the loan restructure policy into 2021, as the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis remains in addition to the flood crisis (White 2020). The NBC granted the request so that the loan restructuring policy will continue until mid- 2021 (Sok 2020).    

While the nine options and loan restructuring have been officially implemented, it is not clearly defined by NBC what should be involved or who should receive which option. As such, the banks and FIs have opted for their discretion in responses to the COVID-19 crisis. As a result, the implementation of the loan restructure policy varies from an institution to another. However, the financial institutions with which we spoke offered three key aspects of restructuring available for COVID-19 affected borrowers:

1. Payment Holiday: Borrowers granted a payment holiday is not required to repay loans at all for a specified period. The interest payments associated with that period of time are added to the left-over principal amount, and a new repayment schedule will be issued at the end of the payment holiday.
2. Period Extension: With a period extension, loan periods are extended so that the monthly payment is reduced to a level within the borrowers’ capacity to repay.
3. Grace Period: Borrowers granted a grace period have the option to repay only interest payments for a specified period of time. This allows them to minimise monthly payments and not pay down the principal for the duration of the grace period.

Our data from interviewing borrowers (N=119) and FI representatives (N= 34) show that the popular option enforced was the “grace period.” We found that 16 were given a grace period, 6 were granted a payment holiday, and in one case, a FI allowed a borrower to repay flexibly. 11 borrowers approached the FIs but were verbally rejected because of ineligibility of the sector (6 borrowers) and the loan restructuring was generally unavailable in their areas (5 borrowers). Seven borrowers were offered a “grace period” but rejected the offer because they were concerned about the financial loss (khart) it would create. Meanwhile, thirty-one borrowers were not aware of the loan restructuring policy at all, and the rest either had the ability to repay or approached their FI for the fear of impacting their credit history and/or being ashamed. The unawareness of the existence of loan restructuring policy is consistent with a finding of a survey (N = 997) conducted in July 2020 with registered and non-registered medium, small, and micro-enterprises of tourism-related businesses in four zones in Cambodia. The survey found that 60 per cent of the respondents were not aware of the bank/MFI debt restructuring policy (The Asia Foundation 2020). 

Not only have FIs limited options for the COVID-19 impacted households, but they also decided not to publicise the loan restructuring policy. Since the loan restructuring policy is informed to clients on a case-by-case basis, many, predominantly, low-income household borrowers in the rural areas are not aware of the policy.

During our field visit, there is a growing sense of fear and confusion among debt-distressed households. These households do not know what kind of supports could be provided to them. A case study below illustrates this sense of fear.

Pu (uncle) Theurn and Ming (aunt) Mao started borrowing in 2014; their first loan was to buy a tractor to plough their 15 hectares of land. After a few years (he could not recall exactly when), his corn and cassava production failed due to drought, at which point the household began to struggle to repay their debts. After sustained losses, the couple decided to sell the tractor. However, they could not repay all the debt, and they decided to sell 10 hectares of their land to repay the loan. At the time of the interview, the middle-aged couple was chopping cassava roots, which were not fully ready to harvest but were harvested a few months early because the couple needed the money to repay the micro-finance debt. Our research team asked him (husband) about the key risks he perceived in agriculture, using the Khmer term phey, literally translated as “to be fearful of.” He responded jokingly, “The main phey (fear)is the due repayment date because I have to repay one after another.” After finishing the sentence, he laughed gently. This story reflects a reality for many borrowers who are struggling to repay—the feeling of phey (fear). To date, the couple is still struggling to make their monthly repayments.

(Chopping premature cassava root Phnom Preuk district, Battambang 2020.
Photo by Phasy RES

Overall, it is important to make all options of loan restructuring available to all COVID-19‑affected borrowers. As evidenced in this case study, debt-distressed households can resort to coping strategies, such as land sale, migration, food consumption reduction, repayment phobia, or fear of FI’s retaliation: collateral confiscation. All of which has (and will continue to have) exacerbated economic vulnerability. At last, the loan restructuring policy should remain even after COVID-19, and other forms of restructuring such as debt forgiveness or interest cancellation should be considered.

This is an excerpt from a study report to be released in June 2021. The full report can be found here on the website of The Center for Khmer Studies (CKS) or The Asia Foundation (TAF) in English and Khmer.

Bio

Phasy RES is a doctoral student in anthropology and sociology at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a research fellow at The Center for Khmer Studies (CKS) under The Asia Foundation’s Ponlok Chomnes Program, funded by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Her PhD research looks at the relationship between microfinance expansion and land security by examining how access to microcredit shapes land access and control in Cambodia. At CKS, under Ponlok Chomes Program, she specifically examined the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis on microfinance borrowers and loan restructuring processes. Apart from these, she has conducted research on a range of topics, including agricultural mechanisation and intensification, anti-malaria drug resistance, the subjectivities of financial literacy, and labour migration in the Sub-Mekong region. Her work has been published in Espace Politique, Malaria Journal, Development Policy Review, Development and Change, and Mekong Migration Network.

The views expressed in this article are solely mine

References

Bylander, Maryann. 2014. “Borrowing across Borders: Migration and Microcredit in Rural Cambodia.” Development and Change 45(2):284–307.

Green, W. Nathan. 2018. “From Rice Fields to Financial Assets: Valuing Land for Microfinance in Cambodia.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (44): 749– 762

Green, W. Nathan and Jennifer Estes. 2018. “Precarious Debt: Microfinance Subjects and Intergenerational Dependency in Cambodia.” Antipode 51(1):129–47

Green W. Nathan & Bylander. Forthcoming. The Coercive Power of Debt: Microfinance and Land Dispossession in Cambodia.

LICADHO. 2020. Driven out: One village’s experience with MFIs and Cross-border migration. LICADHO. Available at from https://www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports.php?perm=229.

MFC and Good Return. 2017.  Over-indebtedness Study Cambodia II: Final Report. Phnom Penh: Microfinance Center and Good Return (unpublished).

Ovesen, Jan and Ing-Britt Trankell. 2014. “Symbiosis of Microcredit and Private Moneylending in Cambodia.” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 15(2):178–96.

Seng, Kimty. 2018. “Revisiting Microcredit’s Poverty-Reducing Promise: Evidence from Cambodia: Microcredit’s Poverty-Reducing Promise.” Journal of International Development 30(4):615–42.

Sok, Chan. November 2020. “Banks and FI loan restructuring extended to until mid-2021.” Khmer Times.  https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50785076/banks-and-fi-loan-restructuring-extended-until-mid-2021/

The Asia Foundation. 2020. Enduring the pandemic: rapid survey in the impact of COVID-19 on MSMES in the tourism sector and households in Cambodia. The Asia Foundation. Available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Cambodia_Enduring-the-Pandemic_RAPID-SURVEY-ON-THE-IMPACT-OF-COVID-19-ON-MSMES-IN-THE-TOURISM-SECTOR-AND-HOUSEHOLDS-IN-CAMBODIA_EN.pdf.

White, Harrison. 2020. MFIs call on NBC to extend loan restructuring into next year. Khmer Times.  Available at: https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50784701/mfis-call-on-nbc-to-extend-loan-restructuring-into-next-year/.

World Bank. 2020. Cambodia Economic Update: Cambodia in the Time of COVID-19- Special Focus: Teacher Accountability and Student Learning Outcomes. Available at: http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/165091590723843418/pdf/Cambodia-Economic-Update-Cambodia-in-the-Time-of-COVID-19-Special-Focus-Teacher-Accountability-and-Student-Learning-Outcomes.pdf

CALL FOR APPLICATIONS: 2021 ASIA FELLOWS (American Political Science Association)

“Evolution and Challenges in Local Governance in Asia”
Virtual Summer Program – July/August

We are pleased to announce a Call for Applications for early-career scholars who would like to participate in this year’s Asia Pacific Workshop. The virtual summer program will be conducted as series of weekly zoom sessions from mid-July through mid-August. The workshop will bring together up to 12 selected scholars to advance research related to local governance and decentralization across Asia. This program is part of a multi-year effort to support political science research among early-career scholars in East and Southeast Asia, and to strengthen research networks linking Asian scholars with their colleagues overseas.

Leading the workshop will be Maria Ela Atienza (University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines), Allen Hicken (University of Michigan, USA), Yuko Kasuya (Keio University, Japan), and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (University of Essex, UK). The workshop will consist of weekly sessions held over 5 weeks (from July 12 through August 13). Following their participation in the full program, alumni will receive 2 years’ membership to APSA and will be eligible to apply for small research grants.

The deadline for applications is Monday, May 31, 2021. See the Call for Applications.pdf.

Eligible Participants 
The workshop is intended for PhD students and post-doctoral fellows in political science, international relations, and other social science disciplines who are citizens of countries in East and Southeast Asia, especially those who are currently based at universities or research institutes in the region (defined as Brunei, Cambodia, China, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam). We also welcome applications from citizens of countries outside the region or who are currently based at universities or research institutes in the United States.

Scholars should apply with a manuscript or research project in progress that they will present at the workshop. Professional fluency in English is required. Applications from scholars working on topics related to the workshop theme (as described below) are especially encouraged.

Workshop Theme
Focusing on East and Southeast Asia, this workshop will examine the heterogeneous experiences and outcomes associated with local governance and decentralization programs designed to devolve authority from central governments to subnational and local levels. As elsewhere around the world, experimentation with decentralization across Asia has produced mixed results; for each modest success story in one policy domain in one country, there is a counter-narrative of failure in another. Participants will explore key theories and puzzles in the study of local governance and decentralization, as well as their connections to and implications for wider inquiries concerning governance, public goods and service provision, identity politics, democratization and autocratization, and urban politics. Participants will utilize a range of methodological tools to analyze public behavior and opinion, mobilizing structures, state responses, and political outcomes before, during, and after the occurrence of popular protests. Thematic emphases include:

The Politics of Local Governance, Identity, and Representation

• The interaction between local and national politics and political organizations
• The politics, promise, and problems with decentralization
• The effects of nation-state building and decentralization on identity politics
• The effects of corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking in regional and local governments
• Causes and consequences of national-local competition over resources, credit claiming, and agenda setting at the subnational level

Distinctive Challenges in Governing Urban and Semi-Urban Spaces

• Overcoming infrastructural challenges in governing and providing services to Asia’s urban mega-cities
• Managing the needs and demands of diverse and cosmopolitan urban populations
• Crisis management and governance in cities, including re-envisioning urban spaces and usage amidst the COVID-19 pandemic
• Urban jurisdictional overlap and complexities of transparent and accountable governance

Democratization and Democratic Backsliding Below National-Level Governments

• When do local politics influence democratization?
• What explains the persistence of subnational authoritarianism after national-level democratization?
• How do national- and local-level democratic backsliding influence each other?
• How do national-level authoritarian leaders impact local governments’ policy delivery?

Local Government Authority and Public Service Delivery

• The complex relationship between local government capacity and the delivery of public services, including education, health, and sanitation
• Emergency response and disaster management at the local or regional level
• Non-homogenous distribution of environmental and other problems (e.g. environmental degradation, poverty, natural hazards, conflict) affecting service delivery and localized responses
• Coordination and relationship of local governments with national governments and other governance actors (e.g. private sector, civil society, political parties and elites, international community) in public service delivery
• Factors affecting public service delivery at the local level

How to Apply
Completed applications, including all necessary supporting documents (in PDF or Word format), must be submitted by May 31. Selected fellows will be contacted in June. Applications must be in English and include:

1. The completed online Application Form.
2. A detailed, recent curriculum vitae/resume.
3. A research statement (2,000 words maximum) describing the work-in-progress you propose to discuss at the workshop. This statement should outline the main focus of the paper, the methods used, the data/fieldwork on which it is based, and how it relates to the workshop theme(s). The research project should not be based on any part of a co-authored project and should not be an excerpt from an already completed work or one that has already been accepted for publication. Submissions may be derived from an ongoing dissertation project if also suitable for a journal article.
4. One letter of reference on official letterhead and scanned as electronic files. If you are a graduate student, the letter should be from your supervisor. If you are a researcher or faculty member, the letter can come from a former dissertation supervisor, a colleague at your home institution, a university official, or an employer. Your letter can be uploaded with your application material or the letter write can e-mail this directly to asiaworkshops@apsanet.org.

For more information, contact asiaworkshops@apsanet.org. Please do not contact the workshop leaders directly.

Australia-Vietnam Enhanced Economic Engagement Grant (AVEG) Pilot Program

On 14 November 2020, as part of a broader package of economic, development and security measures to support Southeast Asia’s recovery from COVID-19, Prime Minister Morrison announced the Mekong-Australia Partnership (MAP), a four-year $232 million investment, led by DFAT, with whole-of-government input. Pillar Three of the six pillars of MAP is focused specifically on Vietnam.

The AVEG Program 2021 will advance Australia’s international economic interests through bilateral engagement on trade and investment policy priorities of the Australian Government. 
Intended outcomes: 

• Increase public awareness of Australia’s economic opportunities in Vietnam
• Develop enduring partnerships across sectors in Australia and Vietnam
• Increase Australia’s capacity to effectively engage with Vietnam in existing and emerging areas of mutual economic interest

Key eligibility criteria: 

• Individuals who intend the grant to be administered by a university should apply on behalf of the university, i.e. your university is the applicant.

For more information, click here

Application deadline: 
Applications are currently open until Friday 14 May, 14:00 AEST

For any questions regarding the program, please email the Vietnam Economic Strategy Team at vietnameconomicstrategy@dfat.gov.au no later than 10 May 2021. 

ASEAN-China Young Leaders Scholarship (ACYLS) 2021

The ACYLS is an initiative put forward by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and echoed by all ASEAN leaders at the 21st ASEAN-China Summit in 2018. It enables ASEAN nationals to pursue post-graduate studies and training opportunities in China, thus enhancing ASEAN’s capacity building and promoting academic and vocation exchanges between China and ASEAN. The Chinese government, through the China Mission to ASEAN in cooperation with the Joint Committee in Jakarta, offers full scholarships for AUN member and associate member universities for the ACYLS 2021.Click >> Guidebook to the ASEAN China Young Leaders Scholarship 

Scholarship categoriesThe 2021 ACYLS intake includes award for: 

• Master’s degree programme
• Doctoral degree programme
• One-semester research scholar programme 

Financial scheme 

ACYLS offers full scholarship covering all program-related expenses including tuition waiver and other school fees, accommodation, round-trip international air fare, comprehensive medical insurance and stipends. 

Length of Scholarship 

Recipients of ACYLS will be sponsored by the scholarship for a certain duration according to their enrolled length of schooling.

Supporting Category	Length of Schooling	Length of Scholarship
Master’s Students	2-3 academic years	2-3 academic years
Doctoral Students	3-4 academic years	3-4 academic years
Research Scholars	4-5 months	4-5 months

Advertisements

Eligibility

Applicants of ACYLS should meet the following criteria: a. Citizen of 10 ASEAN Member States;  
b. In sound physical and mental health;  
c. Proficient in English (i.e., must possess an IELTS score of at least 6.0 or a TOEFL score of at least 80 points); 
d. Holder of an undergraduate degree and under the age of 45 if applying for a Master’s degree; 
e. Holder of a graduate/master’s degree and under the age of 45 if applying for a PhD degree; 
f. Holder of at least an undergraduate degree if applying for the short-term research program; 
g. Having at least one-year work experience within government agencies, public or private institutions, universities, think-tanks or similar social agencies, and preferably has experience in the following: 
– Work related to foreign and international affairs, especially ASEAN and China ASEAN affairs; 
– Work or study in the PRC; 
– Academic work on China or ASEAN-related affairs; 
– Not a concurrent awardee of a Chinese government scholarship; 
– Meets other admission requirements of the Chinese universities to which the applicant has applied. 

Application Procedures 

Step 1- Complete online application by visiting CGSIS (Chinese Government Scholarship Information System) at http://www.csc.edu.cn/studyinchina or http://www.campuschina.org and click “Scholarship Application for Students” to log in. Online submission of the application is compulsory for each applicant by completing the application information and uploading all necessary supporting documents.

Step 2- Prepare the application documents according to the “List of Application Documents” and upload all the required documents into the online application system. Also submit one set of the hard copies of application form and relevant documents to the AUN Secretariat as required by the deadline. AUN Secretariat will then review the qualifications of all applicants and provide the list of recommended recipients to the Joint Committee of the ACYLS, which will decide the final recommendation list. 

Step 3- The Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) will only process the applications recommended by the Joint Committee. Applicants not included in the list will not be considered. CSC reserves the right to make necessary adjustments to the applicants’ host universities. Click >> Guidebook to the ASEAN China Young Leaders Scholarship 

Submission deadline: 12 May 2021

One original hard copy of the applications must be submitted to the AUN Secretariat Office at below address by the deadline. 

Naparat Phirawattanakul (Ms.) 
Senior Programme Officer 
ASEAN University Network (AUN) Secretariat 
17 Floor., Chaloem Rajakumari 60 Building, Chulalongkorn University Phayathai Rd., Bangkok 10330 
Tel: 662-2153640 ext 106 
Fax: 662-2168808 
E-mail: aun.naparat@gmail.com 

http://www.aunsec.org/ACYLS-2021.php

Advertisements

Call for Application: 2021 Higher Education for ASEAN Talents (HEAT): Scholarship Opportunity for ASEAN Faculty Members in the Republic of Korea

Title	[Call for Application] 2021 Higher Education for ASEAN Talents (HEAT): Scholarship Opportunity for ASEAN Faculty Members in the Republic of Korea
Author	KCUE
Date	2021-03-11
Contents	Korean Council for University Education (KCUE) is launching a new scholarship entitled “Higher Education for ASEAN Talents (HEAT): Scholarship Opportunity for ASEAN Faculty Members in the Republic of Korea”. The purpose of this program is to invite faculty members from ASEAN higher education institutions to support their acquisition of a doctoral degree in Korea with the aim to enhance their expertise and promote people-to-people exchanges between Korea and ASEAN.  Year 2021: 30 Candidates* Country Quota and University Quota may vary depending on the application result.  Scholarship Period ◦ 3 years (September 1, 2021 ~ August 31, 2024)  Benefits◦ Roundtrip travel (one time only): Round-trip economy class flight ticket◦ Monthly Allowance: 1,100 USD per month◦ Relocation (Settlement) Allowance (one time only): 300 USD upon arrival◦ Tuition: All admission fees are waived by the host institution◦ Dissertation Printing Costs: 400~600 USD, depending on the actual cost◦ Language Training Costs and Medical Insurance: the amount coverage or benefits will vary depending on each university◦ Others: various incidental allowances depend on each university* All grants will be paid in KRW, and amounts may vary depending on the exchange rate.  KCUE requirements◦ Applicants with ASEAN citizenship◦ Applicants who are academic faculty members at a 4-year college/university * in their home country(*Higher Education Institution offering bachelor’s degree or equivalent courses)◦ Applicants whose highest educational attainment is a master’s degree or its equivalent.◦ Applicants who are in good health both physically and mentally to allow them to pursue their studies while residing in Korea over the long term.◦ Applicants who have discussed an academic leave of absence with the university they belong to and how to contribute to their school after their return.◦ Applicants who are younger than 45 years old on the day that the doctoral program starts (i.e. September 1, 2021).◦ Applicants who have a sufficient level of proficiency in Korean or English.◦ Applicants who meet each university’s additional requirements.  Place of Submission: University Admission’s Office * Applicants are to submit applications by airmail or online to one of the six designated universities directly. For further information, please check Attachments  Deadline of SubmissionUniversity (Application LInks)Deadline of SubmissionChung-Ang University2021.4.9Ewha Womans University2021.3.8 ~ 3.19Jeonbuk National University2021.3.15 ~ 3.26Kangwon National University2021.3.1 ~ 3.26Korea University2021.3.2 ~ 3.31 Kyung Hee University2021.3.15 ~ 4.2 (17:00)    Required documents◦ FORM 1. PERMISSION FOR STUDY LEAVE◦ FORM 2. APPLICANT AGREEMENT◦ FORM 3. PERSONAL MEDICAL ASSESSMENT◦ Original Certificate of Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree and each Transcript ◦ Certificate of Employment◦ Applicant’s Proof of Citizenship Documents * Universities’ additional requirement: please refer to Attachment    Timeline◦ Application Submission: March ~ April◦ 1st Round of Selection: April / 2nd Round of Selection: May◦ Announcement of 2021 HEAT Scholars: June (notification by the universities)◦ Applying for Korean VISA: July◦ Entry into Korea: by August 31st, 2021◦ Course Start Date: September 1st, 2021
Attachments	2021-2 HEAT Graduate Program_Guidelines(FINAL)_Deadline revised.pdf  HEAT Form.docx  [KCUE] HEAT Higher Education for ASEAN Talents_ASEAN Languages.zip

Advertisements